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SUMMARY
Despite their widespread use as predictors of the spot price of oil, oil futures prices tend to be less accurate in
the mean-squared prediction error sense than no-change forecasts. This result is driven by the variability of
the futures price about the spot price, as captured by the oil futures spread. This variability can be explained
by the marginal convenience yield of oil inventories. Using a two-country, multi-period general equilibrium
model of the spot and futures markets for crude oil we show that increased uncertainty about future oil
supply shortfalls under plausible assumptions causes the spread to decline. Increased uncertainty also causes
precautionary demand for oil to increase, resulting in an immediate increase in the real spot price. Thus the
negative of the oil futures spread may be viewed as an indicator of fluctuations in the price of crude oil
driven by precautionary demand. An empirical analysis of this indicator provides evidence of how shifts in
the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls affect the real spot price of crude oil. Copyright  2010
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
The surge in the price of crude oil since 2002 has renewed interest in the question of what
determines the spot and futures price of crude oil and has highlighted the importance of being
able to predict as accurately as possible the evolution of the spot price of oil (see, for example,
Greenspan, 2004a,b, 2005; Bernanke, 2004, 2006; Gramlich, 2004; Davies, 2007; Kohn, 2007).
In this paper, we use insights provided by a theoretical model of the spot and futures market
for crude oil in conjunction with empirical analysis to shed light on the relationship between the
spot price of crude oil, expectations of future oil prices, the price of crude oil futures, and the oil
futures spread (defined as the percent deviation of the oil futures price from the spot price of oil).
In Section 2, we document the use of oil futures prices as predictors of spot prices at central
banks and international organizations. Futures-based forecasts of the price of crude oil inform
monetary policy decisions and affect financial markets’ perceptions of the risks to price stability
and sustainable growth. It is widely believed that oil futures prices can be viewed as effective
long-term supply prices or as the expected price of oil. In Section 3, we put this common practice
to the test using a newly constructed dataset of oil futures prices and oil spot prices. We conduct
a systematic evaluation of the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of oil futures-based forecasts
and of a broader set of oil price forecasting approaches based on the forecast evaluation period
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1991.1–2007.2. A robust finding across all horizons from 1 month to 12 months is that the no-
change forecast tends to be more accurate than forecasts based on other econometric models and
much more accurate than professional survey forecasts of the price of crude oil. Likewise, both
forecasts based on oil futures prices and forecasts based on the oil futures spread tend to be less
accurate than the no-change forecast under standard loss functions including quadratic and absolute
loss. They also are more biased than the no-change forecast.
The result that oil futures prices fail to improve on the accuracy of simple no-change forecasts
contradicts widely held views among policymakers and financial analysts. It also differs from
some earlier empirical results in the academic literature based on shorter samples. Although the
difference in the mean-squared prediction errors (MSPE) is not statistically significant, over the
period in question a real-time forecaster would have been better off using the no-change forecast,
especially at longer horizons. In Section 4 we show that the cause of the larger MSPE of futures-
based forecasts relative to the no-change forecast is not so much that these forecasts are different
on average, but rather the variability of the futures price about the spot price, as captured by the
spread of oil futures. We document that there are large and persistent fluctuations in the oil futures
spread.
In Section 5, we make the case that this fact is linked to the existence of a marginal convenience
yield for crude oil. Inventories of crude oil may serve to avoid interruptions of the production
process or to meet unexpected shifts in demand. This option value is reflected in a convenience
yield (see, for example, Brennan, 1991; Pindyck, 1994a, 2001; Routledge et al., 2000; Schwartz,
1997). We study the implications of the marginal convenience yield for the oil futures spread
in the context of a multi-period, two-country general equilibrium model of the spot and futures
markets for crude oil. We show that shifts in the uncertainty about futures oil supply shortfalls
may explain the excess variability of oil futures prices relative to the spot price that is responsible
for their inferior predictive accuracy.
In the model, an oil-producing country exports oil to an oil-consuming country that uses oil in
producing a final good to be traded for oil or consumed domestically. Oil importers may insure
against uncertainty about stochastic oil endowments by holding above-ground oil inventories or
buying oil futures. Oil producers may sell oil futures to protect against endowment uncertainty.
The model abstracts from oil below the ground. The spot and futures prices of oil are determined
endogenously and simultaneously. Using comparative statics, we establish that under plausible
conditions increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls causes the oil futures spread to
fall. Such uncertainty shifts also raise the current real spot price of oil, as precautionary demand for
oil inventories increases in response to increased uncertainty. Increased uncertainty about future oil
supply shortfalls in the model will cause the real price of oil to overshoot, followed by a gradual
decline of the real price of oil. Hence the negative of the oil futures spread may be viewed as an
indicator of fluctuations in the spot price of crude oil driven by shifts in precautionary demand
for oil.
In Section 6, we evaluate these predictions of our model empirically. First, we show that
the proposed indicator moves as expected during events such as the Persian Gulf War that a
priori should be associated with large shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil. We also
find evidence of shifts in the spread associated with the Asian financial crisis, with 9/11 and
with the 2003 Iraq War, for example. Our findings corroborate earlier results in the literature
based on regression dummies as well as historical decompositions derived from structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) models. Second, our indicator is highly correlated with an independent
estimate of the precautionary demand component of the spot price of crude oil proposed in Kilian
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(2008a, 2009). That alternative estimate is based on a structural VAR model of the global crude oil
market and does not rely on data from the oil futures market. We show that the VAR-based measure
and the futures-based measure have a correlation as high as 81% during 1989.1–2003.12. Third,
we observe that the overshooting pattern of the response of the real price of oil to a precautionary
demand shock in the Kilian (2008a, 2009) VAR model is consistent with the predictions of our
theoretical model. We also contrast our analysis with the use of option-based measures of the
implied volatility of oil prices. The concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2. DO OIL FUTURES PRICES HELP PREDICT THE SPOT PRICE OF OIL?
It is commonplace in policy institutions, including many central banks and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), to use the price of NYMEX oil futures as a proxy for the market’s
expectation of the spot price of crude oil.1 A widespread view is that prices of NYMEX futures
contracts are not only good proxies for the expected spot price of oil, but also better predictors of
oil prices than econometric forecasts. Forecasts of the spot price of oil are used as inputs in the
macroeconomic forecasting exercises that these institutions produce. For example, the European
Central Bank (ECB) employs oil futures prices in constructing the inflation and output-gap forecasts
that guide monetary policy (see Svensson, 2005). Likewise, the IMF relies on futures prices as a
predictor of future spot prices (see, for example, International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 67, 2007, p.
42). Futures-based forecasts of the price of oil also play a role in policy discussions at the Federal
Reserve Board (see, for example, Greenspan, 2004a,b; Bernanke, 2004; Gramlich, 2004). This is
not to say that forecasters do not recognize the potential limitations of futures-based forecasts of
the price of oil. Nevertheless, the perception is that oil futures prices, imperfect as they may be,
are the best available forecasts of the spot price of oil. Before studying the theoretical support for
this view, we will examine its empirical support.
2.1. Forecasting Models
The Benchmark Model
Let Fht denote the current nominal price of the futures contract that matures in h periods, St the
current spot price of oil, and Et[StCh] the expected future spot price at date t C h conditional on
information available at t. A natural benchmark for forecasts based on the price of oil futures is
provided by the random walk model without drift. This model implies that changes in the spot
price are unpredictable, so the best forecast of the future spot price of crude oil is simply the
current spot price:
OStChjt D St h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 1
Below we consider two types of forecasting models based on the price of oil futures. The first
model simply treats the current level of futures prices as the predictor; the second model is based
on the futures spread.
1 Futures contracts are financial instruments that allow traders to lock in today a price at which to buy or sell a fixed quantity
of the commodity on a predetermined date in the future. Futures contracts can be retraded between inception and maturity
on a futures exchange such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The NYMEX offers institutional features
that allow traders to transact anonymously. These features reduce individual default risk and ensure homogeneity of the
traded commodity, making the futures market a low-cost and liquid mechanism for hedging against and for speculating
on oil price risks. The NYMEX light sweet crude contract is the most liquid and largest volume market for crude oil
trading (New York Mercantile Exchange, 2007a).
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Futures Prices as Future Spot Prices
The common view that oil futures prices are the best available predictor of future oil prices implies
the forecasting model
OStChjt D Fht , h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 2
Forecasts Based on the Futures Spread
An alternative approach to forecasting the spot price of oil is to use the spread between the spot
price and the futures price as an indicator of whether the price of oil is likely to go up or down
(see, for example, Gramlich, 2004). If the futures price equals the expected spot price, the spread
should be an indicator of the expected change in spot prices. The rationale for this approach is




St. We explore the




1 C lnFht /St
)
, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 3
To allow for the possibility that the spread may be a biased predictor, it is common to relax the
assumption of a zero intercept:
OStChjt D St
(
1 C Ǫ C lnFht /St
)
, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 4
Alternatively, one can relax the proportionality restriction:
OStChjt D St
(
1 C Ǒ lnFht /St
)
, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 5
Finally, we can relax both the unbiasedness and proportionality restrictions:
OStChjt D St
(
1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnFht /St
)
, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 6
Here Ǫ and Ǒ denote least-squares estimates obtained in real time from recursive regressions.
2.2. Data Description and Timing Conventions
Data Construction
In Section 2.3, we will compare the real-time forecast accuracy of models (1)–(6). Our empirical
analysis is based on daily prices of crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX from the commercial
provider Price-Data.com. The time series begins on 30 March 1983, when crude oil futures were
first traded on the NYMEX, and extends through 28 February 2007. Crude oil futures can have
maturities as long as 7 years. Contracts are for delivery at Cushing, OK. Trading ends 4 days prior
to the 25th calendar day preceding the delivery month. If the 25th is not a business day, trading
ends on the fourth business day prior to the last business day before the 25th calendar day (New
York Mercantile Exchange, 2007b). A common problem in constructing monthly futures prices
of a given maturity is that an h-month contract may not trade on a given day. We identify the
h-month futures contract trading closest to the last trading day of the month and use the price
associated with that contract as the end-of-month value. For all horizons, we obtain a continuous
monthly time series based on a backward-looking window of at most 5 days. For maturities up
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to 3 months, the backward-looking window is at most 3 days. Our approach is motivated by the
objective of computing in a consistent manner end-of-month time series of oil futures prices for
different maturities. This allows us to match up end-of-month spot prices and futures prices as
closely as possible.2 The daily spot price data are obtained from Datastream and refer to the price
of West Texas Intermediate crude oil available for delivery at Cushing, OK. Figure 1 plots the
monthly prices of oil futures contracts for maturities of 1 through 12 months and the spot price
of crude oil starting in 1983.1. Note that contracts of longer maturities only gradually became
available over the course of the sample period.
The Choice of Maturities in the Empirical Analysis
The perception that oil futures prices contain information about future spot prices implicitly relies
on the assumption that oil futures contracts are actively traded at the relevant horizons. In this
subsection we investigate how liquid futures markets are at each maturity h. This question is
important because one would not expect Fht to have predictive content for future spot prices,
unless the market is sufficiently liquid at the relevant horizon.















Futures Price: 3 months
Futures Price: 6 months
Futures Price: 9 months
Futures Price: 12 months
Figure 1. Prices of oil futures contracts and spot price of oil 1983.3–2007.2. Source: Computed as described
in the text based on daily NYMEX oil futures prices and the daily WTI spot price
2 Our approach differs from that in Chernenko et al., 2004). Their approach is to treat futures prices from a window in
the middle of the month as a proxy for the futures price in a given month. Yet another approach is to substitute the price
of a j-month contract for a given day for the missing price of the h-month contract on that day, where j 6D h (see Bailey
and Chan, 1993).
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Policymakers and the public widely believe that the oil futures market provides effective
insurance against risks associated with crude oil production shortfalls and conveys the market’s
assessment of the evolution of future supply and demand conditions in the crude oil market. If the
market were effectively pricing the possibility of, say, a shutdown of the Iranian oil fields or the
demise of the Saudi monarchy within the next 5 years, one would expect active trading at such
long horizons. The evidence below, however, suggests otherwise. Figure 2 shows the monthly
trading volume corresponding to a futures contract with a fixed horizon that is closest to the last
trading day of the month. Volume refers to the number of contracts traded in a given month.3
As illustrated in Figure 2, over the past 25 years trading volume in the futures market has grown
significantly, particularly at the 1-month and 3-month horizon, and to a lesser extent at the 6-month
horizon. In 1989, the NYMEX introduced for the first time contracts exceeding 12 months and
in 1999 a 7-year contract was first introduced. Although long-maturity contracts are available,
the market remains illiquid at horizons beyond 1 year even in recent years. Trading volumes fall
sharply at longer maturities.
This observation is important for our forecast evaluation because one would not expect forecasts
based on futures with long maturities to provide accurate predictions, when only a handful of
contracts are trading. Given the evidence in Figure 2, we therefore restrict ourselves to futures
contracts of up to 1 year in the empirical analysis. In addition, the evidence in Figure 2 suggests
that the public and policymakers have overestimated the ability of oil futures markets to provide
insurance against long-term risks such as political instability in the Middle East or the development
of new oil resources in years to come. Policymakers routinely rely on futures prices for long
maturities in predicting future oil prices. For example, Greenspan (2004a) explicitly referred
to the 6-year oil futures contract in assessing effective long-term supply prices. For similar
statements also see Greenspan (2004b), Gramlich (2004) and Bernanke (2004). The volume data in
Figure 2 suggest that there is little information contained in futures prices beyond 1 year, making
it inadvisable to rely on such data. This conclusion is also consistent with prior studies of the
crude oil futures market between 1983 and 1994 (see Neuberger, 1999) and with perceptions of
industry experts.4
2.3. Real-Time Forecast Accuracy of Futures-Based Forecasting Models
Tables I–V assess the predictive accuracy of various forecasting models against the benchmark
of a random walk without drift for horizons of 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. The forecast evaluation
period is 1991.1–2007.2. The assessment of which forecasting model is most accurate may depend
on the loss function of the forecaster (see Elliott and Timmermann, 2008). We present results for
the MSPE and the mean absolute prediction error (MAPE). We also report the bias of the forecasts,
and we report the number of times that a forecast correctly predicts the sign of the change in the
spot price based on the success ratio statistic of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992). In addition to
ranking forecasting models by each loss function, we formally test the null that a given candidate
3 In contrast to open interest, volume measures the total number of contracts, including those in a position that a trader
closes or that reach delivery, and thus gives a good sense of the overall activity in the futures market. Our method of
data construction is consistent with the conventions used in constructing the monthly futures prices.
4 According to sources within the oil industry who wish to remain anonymous, oil companies are fully aware of how
thin the market is at longer horizons and do not rely on futures price data for such maturities. The perception is that one
trader signing a couple of contracts with a medium-term horizon may easily move the futures price by several dollars on
a given day.
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Figure 2. Volume of NYMEX oil futures contracts. Source: Price-data.com
forecasting model is as accurate as the random walk without drift against the alternative that the
candidate model is more accurate than the no-change forecast. Suitably constructed p-values are
shown in parentheses (as described in the notes to Table I).
Oil Futures Prices as Predictors of Oil Spot Prices
The first two rows of Tables I–V document that the no-change forecast has lower MSPE than
the oil futures forecast at the 1-month, 6-month, 9-month and 12-month horizon. Only at the
3-month horizon is the futures-based forecast more accurate, but the improvement in accuracy
is not statistically significant. Moreover, based on the MAPE metric, the random walk forecast
is more accurate at all horizons. In all cases, the random walk forecast is less biased than the
futures forecast. Nor do futures forecasts have important advantages when it comes to predicting
the sign of the change in oil prices. Only at the 9-month and 12-month horizons is the success
ratio significant at the 10% level and 5% level, respectively, but the improvement is only 2.6
and 3.6 percentage points. We conclude that, over this period, oil futures prices were no more
accurate predictors of the price of oil than simple no-change forecasts, contrary to the folk
wisdom discussed in the Introduction. In fact, the forecast accuracy of oil futures prices and
spreads was typically lower than that of the no-change forecast, although, as will be shown in
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St 6.998 0.172 1.941 n.a.




1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnF1t /St
)




1 C Ǒ lnF1t /St
)




1 C Ǫ C lnF1t /St
)




1 C lnF1t /St
)
1.02 0.212 1.00 0.443
(0.807) (0.676) (0.898)
St1 C Ǫ  1.00 0.186 1.00 0.479
(0.384) (0.522) (0.497)
St1 C st1 1.99 0.061 1.34 0.490
(0.457) (0.003) (0.646)
St1 C st3 1.44 0.015 1.15 0.521
(0.717) (0.151) (0.294)
St1 C st6 1.19 0.005 1.06 0.495
(0.835) (0.087) (0.567)
St1 C st9 1.17 0.016 1.06 0.495
(0.932) (0.806) (0.567)
St1 C st12 1.06 0.023 1.00 0.505
(0.305) (0.521) (0.443)
Note: All MSPE and MAPE results are presented as ratios relative to the benchmark no-change forecast model, for which
we report the actual level of the MSPE and MAPE. The bias is defined as the average amount by which StCh exceeds
the prediction. The forecast evaluation period is 1991.1–2007.2. The initial estimation window is 1983.4–1990.12. For
regressions based on 6-month futures prices the estimation window begins in 1983.10; for the 9-month futures price in
1986.12; for the 12-month futures price in 1989.1.Fht is the futures price that matures in h periods; it,m is the m-month
interest rate; and stl denotes the trailing geometric average of the monthly percent change for l months. p-values
are in parentheses. All p-values refer to pairwise tests of the null of a random walk without drift. Comparisons of
non-nested models without estimated parameters are based on the DM-test of Diebold and Mariano (1995) with N(0,1)
critical values. Nested model comparisons with estimated parameters are based on Clark and West (2006). For the rolling
regression estimates of the random walk with drift we use N(0,1) critical values under quadratic loss; for recursive
estimates under quadratic loss and for all estimates under absolute loss we use bootstrap critical values as described in
Clark and West. The success ratio is defined as the fraction of forecasts that correctly predict the sign of the change in
the price of oil. The sign test in the last column is based on Pesaran and Timmermann (1992).
Section 5.3., the gains in forecast accuracy from using the no-change forecast are not statistically
significant.
Oil Future Spreads as Predictors of Future Spot Prices
Alternatively, we may use recursively estimated spread regressions to generate forecasts of the
price of oil. Rows 3–6 in Tables I–V document that the no-change forecast has lower MSPE
than spread-based forecasts at horizons of 6, 9 and 12 months. At horizons 1 and 3 in some
cases the spread models have lower MSPE, but the improvement is never statistically significant
and no one spread model performs well systematically. Based on the MAPE rankings, the no-
change forecast is more accurate at all horizons. These results are broadly consistent with the
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St 19.560 0.435 3.099 n.a.




1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnF3t /St
)




1 C Ǒ lnF3t /St
)




1 C Ǫ C lnF3t /St
)




1 C lnF3t /St
)
0.97 0.649 1.03 0.479
(0.348) (0.920) (0.648)
St1 C it,3 1.01 0.167 1.00 0.541
(0.715) (0.632) N.A.
St1 C Ǫ  1.01 0.484 1.01 0.485
(0.351) (0.345) (0.413)
St1 C st1 1.42 0.210 1.17 0.510
(0.710) (0.119) (0.418)
St1 C st3 1.42 0.238 1.12 0.500
(0.961) (0.707) (0.524)
St1 C st6 1.13 0.213 1.04 0.485
(0.893) (0.315) (0.685)
St1 C st9 1.04 0.224 1.00 0.557
(0.531) (0.023) (0.061)
St1 C st12 1.02 0.223 0.99 0.546
(0.454) (0.005) (0.101)
SCFt,3 1.57 1.905 1.34 0.500
(0.997) (0.999) (0.338)
Note: See Table I.
earlier evidence for the futures forecasts. Finally, rows 3–6 reveal some evidence that spread
models may help predict the direction of change at horizons of 9 and 12 months. The gains in
accuracy are statistically significant, but quite moderate. There is no such evidence at shorter
horizons.5
Relationship with Forecast Efficiency Regressions
It is useful to compare our results for the spread model in Tables I–V to the closely related literature
on forecast efficiency regressions (see, for example, Chernenko et al., 2004; Chinn et al., 2005).
Consider the full-sample regression model:
stCh D ˛ C ˇ
(
fht  st
) C utCh, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12
where lower-case letters denote variables in logs and utCh denotes the error term. Forecast efficiency
in the context of the oil futures spread means that the hypothesis H0 : ˛ D 0, ˇ D 1 holds. A
5 Motivated by term-structure models, we also experimented with models including a weighted average of spreads at
different horizons. These models consistently performed so poorly that no results will be reported.
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St 34.058 0.937 4.466 n.a.




1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnF6t /St
)




1 C Ǒ lnF6t /St
)




1 C Ǫ C lnF6t /St
)




1 C lnF6t /St
)
1.07 1.684 1.04 0.485
(0.721) (0.910) (0.483)
St1 C it,6 1.03 0.382 1.01 0.557
(0.713) (0.708) N.A.
St1 C Ǫ  1.00 1.093 1.05 0.515
(0.132) (0.155) (0.021)
St1 C st1 1.32 0.543 1.10 0.505
(0.780) (0.275) (0.501)
St1 C st3 1.21 0.605 1.06 0.479
(0.874) (0.571) (0.762)
St1 C st6 1.06 0.671 1.02 0.510
(0.691) (0.170) (0.424)
St1 C st9 0.99 0.585 0.98 0.557
(0.293) (0.988) (0.091)
St1 C st12 1.01 0.708 1.00 0.510
(0.437) (0.085) (0.411)
Note: See Table I.
rejection of these restrictions is interpreted as evidence of the existence of a time-varying risk
premium (see, for example, Fama and French, 1987, 1988; Chernenko et al., 2004).6 Chernenko
et al. report that the hypothesis of forecast efficiency cannot be rejected at conventional significance
levels. It is important to bear in mind that such evidence does not necessarily mean that oil prices
are forecastable based on the spread in practice. First, non-rejection of a null hypothesis does
not imply that the null model is true. In fact, we showed that the forecasting model (3) that
imposes this null does not dominate the no-change forecasts in out-of-sample forecasts. Second,
as our forecasting results show, relaxing one or more of the restrictions implied by forecast
efficiency may either improve or worsen the forecast accuracy of the spread model, depending
on the bias–variance trade-off. In particular, such models require the estimation of additional
parameters compared with the no-change forecast, and the resulting loss in forecast precision may
outweigh the benefits from reduced forecast bias. Thus there is no contradiction between our
results and the forecast efficiency results in the literature.
6 Such tests implicitly postulate that the trader’s loss function coincides with the econometrician’s quadratic loss function.
If that is not the case, forecast efficiency tests tend to be biased in favor of the alternative hypothesis (see Elliott et al.,
2005).
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St 46.574 1.791 5.161 N.A.




1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnF9t /St
)




1 C Ǒ lnF9t /St
)




1 C Ǫ C lnF9t /St
)




1 C lnF9t /St
)
1.17 3.017 1.05 0.526
(0.898) (0.948) (0.080)
St1 C Ǫ  0.99 2.090 1.00 0.557
(0.111) (0.130) (0.000)
St1 C st1 1.27 1.408 1.09 0.495
(0.876) (0.342) (0.611)
St1 C st3 1.10 1.492 1.02 0.510
(0.658) (0.245) (0.431)
St1 C st6 0.99 1.556 0.99 0.595
(0.303) (0.092) (0.581)
St1 C st9 0.98 1.581 0.99 0.510
(0.168) (0.048) (0.401)
St1 C st12 0.99 1.578 1.00 0.500
(0.315) (0.109) (0.516)
Note: See Table I.
In addition, it can be shown that the results in Chernenko et al. are not robust to updating the
sample. Despite differences in the timing conventions used in constructing the monthly futures
price data, we are able to replicate their results qualitatively using our data but with their sample
period. For the full sample, however, we do reject the hypothesis of forecast efficiency at longer
horizons (see Table VI). This pattern is consistent with the earlier forecasting results. This rejec-
tion of forecast efficiency occurs despite the fact that Ǫ is close to zero and Ǒ fairly close to 1,
as suggested by theory.
3. WHAT IS THE MOST ACCURATE PREDICTOR OF THE SPOT PRICE OF OIL?
The preceding section demonstrated that simple no-change forecasts of the price of oil
tend to be more accurate in the MSPE sense than forecasts based on oil futures prices,
but this does not rule out that there are alternative predictors with even lower MSPE.
The first part of this section therefore broadens the range of forecasting methods consid-
ered to include some additional predictors that are of practical interest. One alternative
approach to measuring market expectations is the use of survey data. While economists have
used survey data extensively in measuring the risk premium embedded in foreign exchange
futures (see Chinn and Frankel, 1995), this approach has not been applied to oil futures,
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St 65.978 2.540 5.885 n.a.




1 C Ǫ C Ǒ lnF12t /St
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1 C Ǒ lnF12t /St
)




1 C Ǫ C lnF12t /St
)




1 C lnF12t /St
)
1.20 4.189 1.07 0.536
(0.916) (0.789) (0.021)
St1 C it,12 0.99 1.439 1.02 0.582
(0.480) (0.804) N.A.
St1 C Ǫ  0.98 3.200 1.18 0.552
(0.108) (0.269) (0.001)
St1 C st1 1.09 2.218 1.05 0.505
(0.282) (0.303) (0.499)
St1 C st3 1.04 2.268 1.03 0.490
(0.484) (0.478) (0.668)
St1 C st6 1.00 2.321 1.01 0.438
(0.314) (0.355) (0.966)
St1 C st9 0.98 2.340 1.01 0.469
(0.234) (0.274) (0.816)
St1 C st12 0.99 2.346 1.00 0.479
(0.238) (0.199) (0.728)
SCFt,12 1.64 4.808 1.18 0.515
(0.979) (0.954) (0.122)
Note: See Table I.
Table VI. Asymptotic p-values for forecast efficiency regressions
Horizon Ǫ Ǒ H0 : ˛ D 0 H0 : ˇ D 1 H0 : ˛ D 0, ˇ D 1
3-month 0.029 1.160 0.063 0.398 0.247
6-month 0.057 0.766 0.037 0.315 0.037
12-month 0.111 0.731 0.008 0.223 0.004
Note: For the 3- and 6-month regressions, the sample period is 1989.4–2007.2. For the 12-month regression, the sample
is 1990.1–2007.2. All t-and Wald-tests have been computed based on HAC standard errors.
with the exception of recent work by Wu and McCallum (2005). Yet another approach is
the use of more sophisticated econometric forecasting models of the spot price of crude
oil.
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3.1. Other Candidate Forecasting Models
Survey Forecasts
Given the significance of crude oil to the international economy, it is surprising that there are few
organizations that produce monthly forecasts of spot prices. In the oil industry, where the spot
price of oil is critical to investment decisions, oil firms tend to make annual forecasts of future
spot prices for horizons as long as 15–20 years, but these are not publicly available. The US
Department of Energy’s International Energy Agency (IEA) uses a structural econometric model
of crude oil supply and demand to produce quarterly forecasts of the spot price of oil, but these
forecasts are available only beginning in late 2004. The Economist Intelligence Unit has produced
annual forecasts since the 1990s for horizons of up to 5 years. None of these sources provides
monthly forecasts.
A source of monthly forecasts of the price of crude oil is Consensus Economics Inc., a UK-
based company that compiles private sector forecasts in a variety of countries. Initially, the sample
consisted of more than 100 private firms; it now contains about 70 firms. Of interest to us are the
survey expectations for the 3- and 12-month-ahead spot price of West Texas Intermediate crude
oil, which corresponds to the type and grade delivered under the NYMEX futures contract. The
survey provides the arithmetic average, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation
for each survey month beginning in October 1989 and ending in February 2007. We use the
arithmetic mean at the relevant horizon:
OStChjt D SCFt,h , h D 3, 12 7
Econometric Forecasts
An alternative to modeling expectations of spot prices for crude oil is to use econometric models.
One example of such econometric models is the random walk model without drift introduced
earlier. In this section, we introduce the random walk with drift and the Hotelling model as
additional competitors. Given that oil prices have been persistently trending upward (or downward)
at times, it is natural to consider a random walk model with drift. One possibility is to estimate
this drift recursively, resulting in the forecasting model
OStChjt D St
(
1 C Ǫ) , h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 8
Alternatively, a local drift term may be estimated using rolling regressions:
OStChjt D St1 C stl, h D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, l D 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 9
where OStChjt is the forecast of the spot price at t C h; and 1 C stl is the geometric average
of the monthly percent change for the preceding l months, i.e., the percent change in the spot
price between t and t  l C 1. This model postulates that traders extrapolate from the spot price’s
recent behavior when they form expectations about the future spot price. The local drift model is
appealing in that it may capture ‘short-term forecastability’ that arises from local trends in the oil
price data.
An alternative approach is motivated by Hotelling’s (1931) model, which predicts that the price
of an exhaustible resource such as oil appreciates at the risk-free rate of interest:
OStChjt D St1 C it,h, h D 3, 6, 12 10
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where it,h refers to the interest rate at the relevant maturity h.7 Although the Hotelling
model seems too stylized to generate realistic predictions, we include this method given
recent evidence that the Hotelling model does well in forecasting the future price of oil
(see Wu and McCallum, 2005). We use the Treasury bill rate as a proxy for the risk free
rate.8
3.2. Real-Time Forecast Accuracy of Other Forecasting Approaches
In this subsection, we compare the real-time forecast accuracy of models (7)–(10) to that of
the no-change forecast in (2). Section 2.3 established that the no-change forecast tends to be
more accurate than models based on the price of oil futures. An obvious question is whether
the no-change forecast can be improved upon, for example, by using information on interest
rates.
Hotelling Model
Row 7 in Tables II, III, and V shows that the random walk model has lower MSPE than the
Hotelling model at horizons of 3 and 6 months, whereas at the 12-month horizon the ranking is
reversed. This reversal is not statistically significant, however. Based on the MAPE, the no-change
forecast is superior at all three horizons. The Hotelling forecasting model has systematically lower
bias at all three horizons than the no-change forecast. It is also systematically better at predicting
the sign of the change in the price of oil than futures forecasts, although we cannot assess the
statistical significance of the improvement, given that there is no variability at all in the sign
forecast.
Random Walk Models with Drift
The next six rows in Tables I–V document that allowing for a drift in no case significantly lowers
the MSPE of the random walk model, when the drift is estimated based on rolling regressions,
and only in one case when the drift is estimated recursively. Allowing for a drift lowers the
MAPE at some horizons and for some models, but the gains are not systematic, and different
models work well for different horizons. Again, the Clark and West (2006) test rejects the null
of no predictability in several cases (mainly at the 9-month horizon). As discussed earlier, that
rejection does not necessarily translate into accuracy gains in real-time forecasting, as evidenced
by the MAPE rankings. In some cases, allowing for a drift also improves significantly the ability
to predict the sign of the change of the oil price at longer horizons, but only when the drift is
estimated recursively. In general, the results for the random walk with drift are quite sensitive
to the model specification and forecast horizon, and they do not account for the ‘specification
mining’ implicit in considering a large number of alternative models with drift (see Inoue and
Kilian, 2004, and the references therein). There is no evidence that such models dominate the
no-change forecast.
7 Assuming perfect competition, no arbitrage, and no uncertainty, oil companies extract oil at a rate that equates: (1) the
value today of selling the oil less the costs of extraction; (2) and the present value of owning the oil, which, given the
model’s assumptions, is discounted at the risk free rate. In competitive equilibrium, oil companies extract crude oil at the
socially optimal rate.
8 Specifically, we use the 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month constant-maturity Treasury bill rates from the Federal Reserve
Board’s website http://federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm.
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Professional Survey Forecasts
The last row in Tables II and V shows that the consensus survey forecast has much higher
MSPE than the no-change forecast at both the 3-month and 12-month horizons. It also has a
larger bias and higher MAPE, and there is no statistically significant evidence that it is better at
predicting signs than a coin flip. The survey forecast is also inferior to the futures-based forecasts,
suggesting that survey respondents do not rely on oil futures price data alone in forming their
expectations.
3.3. Why the No-Change Forecast is a Plausible Measure of the Expected Spot Price
The central result of Section 3.2 is that no-change forecasts of the price of oil tend to be
more accurate than forecasts based on econometric models and more accurate than survey
forecasts.9 This result is consistent with views among oil experts. For example, Peter Davies,
chief economist of British Petroleum, has noted that ‘we cannot forecast oil prices with any
degree of accuracy over any period whether short or long’ (see Davies, 2007). The favorable
forecasting performance of the no-change forecast also is consistent with the observed high
persistence of the nominal spot price of oil (see, for example, Diebold and Kilian, 2000).
The high autocorrelation of commodity prices in general has been widely recognized in the
literature (see, for example, Deaton and Laroque, 1992, 1996). Finally, it is important to
stress that the superior forecasting accuracy of the random walk model without drift does not
contradict theoretical results in the literature that oil prices are endogenous with respect to
global macroeconomic conditions (see, for example, Barsky and Kilian, 2002). The first point
to keep in mind is that macroeconomic determinants such as US interest rates, US inflation,
or global economic growth are but one of many determinants of the price of oil. For example,
many of the major oil price increases in recent decades have been associated with unforeseen
political disturbances in the Middle East and rising concerns about future oil supply shortfalls
(see Kilian, 2009). Hence one would not expect forecasting models based on macroeconomic
fundamentals alone to be successful in practice. The second point to bear in mind is that
predictability that exists in the population may be difficult to exploit in real-time in finite samples.
The link from macroeconomic fundamentals to the price of oil is complicated and likely to be
nonlinear. Even if the spot price of crude oil does not truly follow a random walk, random
walk forecasts tend to be attractive in terms of their MSPE since the reduction in variance
from excluding other predictors in small samples will typically more than offset the omitted
variable bias. Thus the superior forecast accuracy of the no-change forecast relative to forecasting
methods based on economic fundamentals does not invalidate economic models of the crude oil
market.
9 This result differs from at least some earlier studies. For example, Chernenko et al. (2004) report evidence that futures-
based forecasts have marginally lower MSPE than the no-change forecast at horizons of 3, 6 and 12 months. In related
work, Wu and McCallum (2005) find that futures prices are generally inferior to the no-change forecast, but report that
spread regressions have lower MSPE than the no-change forecast at short horizons (also see Pagano and Pisani, 2006).
These findings do not contradict our results. The differences in MSPE rankings can be traced mainly to differences in
the sample period. The sample period considered in our paper is longer than in any previous study. Further sensitivity
analysis suggests that evidence of accuracy gains, sometimes obtained in samples shorter than ours, tends to vanish when
the full sample is examined.
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4. WHY IS THE MSPE OF OIL FUTURES PRICES SO LARGE RELATIVE TO THE
NO-CHANGE FORECAST?
The preceding section demonstrated that based on the MSPE ranking the most accurate predictor
of the nominal price of oil is the no-change forecast. This section examines in greater detail
the differences between the no-change forecast and the forecast based on oil futures prices. A
formal analysis of what precisely goes wrong with the oil futures forecast will help motivate the
theoretical analysis of the oil spot and futures markets in the next section. For this purpose it is
convenient to express the deviation of the futures price from the no-change forecast in percentage
terms as fht  st.
There are two possible reasons for the higher MSPE of Fht relative to St. One is higher forecast
bias; the other is a higher forecast variance. In Table VII, we first evaluate the possibility that Fht
is different on average from St. For expository purposes, we focus on the 3-month and 12-month
horizons. Qualitatively similar results hold for other horizons. Our sample period is 1989.1–2007.2,
as a contiguous time series for the 12-month spread becomes available only starting in 1989.1.
Using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors, on average both
the 3-month and 12-month spread are statistically different from zero at the 1% level. Although the
rejection is decisive, Table VII shows that the mean deviation is comparatively small in magnitude
(about 1% at the 3-month horizon and near 4% at the 12 month horizon).
Whereas the bias of futures prices relative to the no-change forecast seems small, the variability
about the no-change forecast is not. As Table VII shows, at any point in time, the discrepancy
between the futures price and the spot price may be very large and go in either direction. It is this
variability of the deviation of futures prices from spot prices rather than the differences in mean
that drives the larger MSPE of futures-based forecasts and that makes the use of such oil price
forecasts inadvisable. The time variation in the spread is not only large but also highly persistent.
In Table VII, we measure this persistence by modeling the spread as an autoregression with the
lag order selected by the Akaike Information Criterion. Based on the fitted autoregressive models,
we compute the sum of the autoregressive coefficients as a measure of persistence as suggested by
Andrews and Chen (1994). The estimated persistence for the 3-month spread in the first column
is 0.73, whereas that for the 12-month spread is 0.83.
The evidence in Table VII is important because it suggests that the key to understanding the
lower predictive accuracy of oil futures prices relative to the no-change forecast is to understand
the causes of the excess variability of oil futures prices relative to the spot price of oil. In the next
Table VII. Time series features of fht  st (%)
3 months 12 months
Mean (p-value) 1.10 4.21
(0.00) (0.00)




Note: The sample for the 3-month forecasts is 1983.4–2007.2, and that for the 12-month forecast is 1989.1–2007.2,
reflecting the data constraints. The p-values of the test for a zero mean are based on HAC standard errors. The measure
of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coefficients proposed by Andrews and Chen (1994). The autoregressive
lag order is determined using the AIC with an upper bound of 24 lags.
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section we propose a theoretical explanation of this fact. We observe that the difference between
the oil futures price and the spot price of oil is not accounted for by the interest rate alone, but
that it also reflects the value that firms derive from having ready access to oil, a fact commonly
referred to as the convenience yield. We propose a theoretical model that explains the persistent
and large fluctuations in the spread in terms of fluctuations in the marginal convenience yield.
The model implies that fluctuations in the marginal convenience yield can be directly linked to
shifting fundamentals in the form of expectation shifts about future oil supply shortfalls. Whereas
concerns about future supply shortfalls may in principle arise in any commodity market, there is
reason to believe that such concerns historically have been particularly relevant in the crude oil
market and may explain both large and sharp fluctuations in the spread over time.
5. A TWO-COUNTRY GENERAL EQILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE OIL FUTURES
AND OIL SPOT MARKETS
5.1. Model Description
The model in this section can be viewed as a generalization of the analysis in Pindyck (1994a,
2001). The key difference is that we explicitly derive some of the relationships postulated by
Pindyck and that we model the determinants of the convenience yield rather than treating the
convenience yield as exogenously given. There are two countries: the United States and Saudi
Arabia. Saudi Arabia trades its oil endowment with the United States in exchange for a consumption
good that the United States produces from oil to be delivered at the end of the period. The United
States consumes some of the final consumption good and sells the rest to Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia is treated as an endowment economy in recognition of the fact that capacity constraints have
been binding in global crude oil production in recent years (see Kilian, 2008b). Each period, Saudi
Arabia receives a random oil endowment Qωt. The oil endowment in period t is Qωt D ω C εt with
probability ; and Qωt D ω  Oεt with probability 1   and Oεt D εt
/
1   such that E Qωt D ω.
The variance of the oil endowment is 2ε .
In each period, the United States chooses: (1) next period’s above-ground inventory holdings
of oil (It); (2) the number of oil futures contracts that deliver one barrel of oil next period; (3) the
number of risk-free one-period bonds that yield (1 C rt,tC1); and (4) the quantity of oil to use in
the production of the consumption good. Saudi Arabia chooses the number of oil futures contracts
and the number of risk-free bonds it wishes to hold. The price of the consumption good in period
t is Pt and the spot price of oil is St. The price of the consumption good is the numeraire.
5.2. The U.S. Demand for Oil
The United States chooses the amount of oil to use in the production of the consumption good
and the amount of oil to store as above-ground inventory. Imported oil can be transformed into
the consumption good using the production function FZt, where Zt is the quantity of oil the
United States uses in producing the consumption good. We postulate that F0Zt > 0, F00Zt < 0,
F000Zt > 0, and lim
Zt!0
F0Zt D 1. The United States chooses Zt such that the marginal product
of oil equals the real price of oil in terms of the consumption good:
St
/
Pt D F0Zt 11
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which implies the demand schedule:
ZSt, Pt  F01St
/
Pt.
The resource constraint for crude oil is given by the identity
It  Qωt  ZSt, Pt.
Reinterpreting equation (11) as a demand function in It, we obtain the inverse net demand
function expressed as a function of the random Saudi oil endowment and the change in inventories:
St
Pt
D F0 Qωt  It  D Qωt, It.
If St
/
Pt is drawn on the vertical axis and It on the horizontal axis, D Qωt, It is upward-sloping
in It.
5.3. No-Arbitrage Condition 1: The Oil Futures Market
If we are willing to impose, in addition, that both the United States and Saudi Arabia are risk
neutral, as is commonly assumed, then the expected real price of the marginal futures contract






Using a linear Taylor series approximation, we obtain
Ft ³ Et[StC1]
If the oil futures price and the conditional expectation of the price of oil were exactly equal,
then the oil futures price would be the minimum MSPE predictor by construction (see Granger,
1969). Since this relationship holds only to a first-order approximation, other predictors may have
lower MSPE. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if other predictors had significantly lower MSPE
than the oil futures price forecast, since the linear approximation error is likely to be small. This
observation suggests three empirical tests of the assumption of risk neutrality.
First, no arbitrage implies that the oil futures price is an approximately unbiased predictor of
the spot price. This follows from substituting Et[StCh] D StCh  etCh, where etCh is a zero-mean
expectational error, in the arbitrage condition above and taking expectations. Under the alternative
assumption of risk aversion we would obtain Ft < Et[StCh], approximately, and hence on average
Fht < StCh8h (see Pindyck, 2001, p. 18). Table VIII(a) shows that on average Fht < StCh8h, but
the bias tends to be small and, except for a marginal rejection at the 12-month horizon, we do not
reject the hypothesis that oil futures prices are unbiased predictors. A second implication of the no-
arbitrage condition is that in a regression of stCh on f
h
t the intercept and slope coefficients should
be approximately zero and one, respectively. Table VIII(b) shows that neither the null hypothesis
of a zero intercept nor the null hypothesis of a unity slope can be rejected at the 5% level at any
horizon h. Moreover, the slope estimates are quite close to unity in all cases. Third, a rejection of
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the null of equal predictive accuracy in favor of the no-change forecast having a lower MSPE than
the oil futures price would cast doubt on the risk-neutral model. Although Tables I–V showed
that the no-change forecast typically has lower MSPE than the oil futures price, in assessing the
realism of the assumption of risk neutrality we need to allow for the fact that MSPE estimates are
subject to sampling error. Table VIII(c) shows that a one-sided DM-test at the 10% level does not
reject the null hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy in favor of the no-change forecast being
more accurate than the oil futures price.10 On the basis of these three tests of the no-arbitrage
condition, we conclude that the data are broadly consistent with the assumption of risk neutrality.
The assumption of risk neutrality simplifies the derivation of the comparative statics results in
Section 5.6. Under the alternative assumption of risk aversion substantively identical comparative
statics results could be derived under slightly stronger assumptions. Since risk neutrality does not
seem grossly at odds with the data, since the assumption of risk neutrality simplifies the exposition,
and since our qualitative results in Section 5.6 do not depend on that assumption, we focus on the
risk-neutral case in the remainder of the paper.
Table VIII(A). Testing the unbiasedness of Fht relative to StCh
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Mean (%) 0.16 0.91 2.89 5.60 7.77
(p-value) (0.77) (0.59) (0.31) (0.10) (0.05)
Note: The sample periods correspond to Tables I–V. Unbiasedness implies that fht  stCh is zero on average. The
p-values of the test for a zero mean are based on HAC standard errors.
Table VIII(B). Testing the coefficient restrictions implied by risk neutrality
Horizon Ǫ Ǒ H0 : ˛ D 0 H0 : ˇ D 1
1 0.050 0.987 0.131 0.157
3 0.172 0.955 0.080 0.110
6 0.251 0.941 0.104 0.167
9 0.213 0.964 0.193 0.318
12 0.090 1.012 0.392 0.454
Note: The sample periods correspond to Table VI. The regression model is stCh D ˛ C ˇfht C utCh. The p-values of the
tests are based on HAC standard errors.
Table VIII(C). Testing the predictive power of Fht
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
p-value 0.191 0.653 0.284 0.114 0.102
Note: The sample periods correspond to Tables I–V. The table shows p-values of the DM-test of equal predictive accuracy
against the alternative that the no-change forecast has lower MSPE, which differs from the one-sided alternative specified
in Tables I–V.
10 This test differs from the DM-test conducted in Tables I–V where we tested the null hypothesis of equal predictive
accuracy against the alternative that oil futures prices are more accurate predictors than the current spot price.
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5.4. No-Arbitrage Condition 2: The Bond Market
Under risk neutrality, the real value of a bond today must equal the discounted real present value
of a bond tomorrow:
1
Pt












A linear Taylor series approximation implies that
1
/
ˇ1 C rt,tC1 ³ 1 , rt,tC1 ³ 1
/
ˇ  1 120
5.5. No-Arbitrage Condition 3: The Market for Storage
The distinguishing feature of our model is the existence of a market for storage. Storage takes the
form of holding above-ground oil inventories. The term convenience yield in the literature refers
to the benefits arising from access to crude oil in the form of inventories such as the ability to
avoid disruptions of the production process or the ability to meet unexpected demand for the final
good. The convenience yield is a commonly used modeling device (see, for example, Brennan,
1991; Fama and French, 1988; Gibson and Schwartz, 1990; Pindyck, 1994a; Routledge et al.,
2000; Schwartz, 1997). Its microeconomic foundations have been discussed in Williams (1987),
Ramey (1989), Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995), and Considine (1997), among others. It is
important to stress that the existence of a convenience yield arises from the convex adjustment
costs of firms rather than the risk aversion of consumers (see Pindyck, 1994b). Thus the existence
of a convenience yield is equally consistent with risk-averse and with risk-neutral preferences, and
our evidence in Section 5.3 that risk neutrality cannot be rejected in the data does not contradict
the existence of a convenience yield. For further discussion see also Williams (1987).
We denote the convenience yield by g D gIt, 2ε . Let g1 D g1It, 2ε  denote the marginal
convenience yield associated with holding additional above-ground inventories between t and
t C 1. Following the commodity pricing literature, we impose that g1 > 0, g11 < 0,and g12 > 0,
where gi denotes the derivative of g with respect to its ith argument and gij the cross-partial
derivative of g with respect to the arguments i and j. As increases in the variance make production
shortfalls more likely, the marginal convenience yield from holding inventories is increasing in





ε  D 1
holds, which ensures that the United States holds strictly positive inventories. With g1It, 2ε  on
the vertical axis and above-ground inventory holdings on the horizontal axis, the intersection of
the g1It, 2ε  curve and inventory holdings It describes the equilibrium in the market for storage.
Abstracting from costs of storage, no arbitrage implies that storing a barrel of oil above ground
for one period and simultaneously selling short a one-period futures contract is a risk-free strategy.
By no arbitrage, the returns to this investment must equal the return on investing the same amount
at the risk-free rate:
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Pt given equation (12), we obtain




³ 1 C rt,tC1g1 13
Equation (13) shows that the difference between the capitalized real spot price and the real futures
price is equal to the capitalized marginal convenience yield.
5.6. A Permanent Mean-Preserving Spread of Oil Endowments
In this subsection, we derive two comparative statics results. The first result is that an increase
in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls immediately raises the real spot price of oil; the
second result is that under plausible assumptions this increase in uncertainty lowers the oil futures
spread. We model the increase in uncertainty as a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the
oil endowment shock. The thought experiment is an increase in εt.
The mean-preserving spread helps us abstract from changes in the conditional mean of oil
supplies and focus on changes in the conditional variance. The motivation for this modeling choice
is best seen by focusing on the example of the Persian Gulf War. Events such as the invasion of
Kuwait in August of 1990 have two distinct effects. First, they cause a reduction in expected oil
supply. This oil supply shock represents a change in the conditional mean of oil supplies. It has
been documented in the literature that such a shock indeed occurred in 1990, but that this supply
shock fails to explain the bulk of the movements in the real price of oil in 1990/91. Second, there
is an increase in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. Indirect evidence that the price
spike of 1990/91 was driven by increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls has been
presented in Kilian (2008b). To keep the model tractable, we model this increased uncertainty
as an increase in the conditional variance of oil supplies, implicitly abstracting from the global
business cycle or any other change in the conditional mean.
Result 1: An Increase in Uncertainty Increases the Real Spot Price
We solve the no-arbitrage condition (13) for St
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Pt] by the no-arbitrage condition in the futures market. Using equation (12)
to substitute for the real price of oil in terms of the marginal product, we arrive at
F0 Qωt  It D ˇEt[F0 QωtC1  ItC1] C g1It, 2ε ,
implying that the United States equates the marginal benefits and marginal costs of these inventory
holdings. The mean-preserving spread drives a wedge between the left-hand and right-hand side
of this intertemporal marginal efficiency condition. Because F0. is convex, the mean-preserving
spread increases Et[F0 QωtC1  ItC1] by Jensen’s inequality (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). It
also increases the marginal willingness to pay for inventories, given by g1It, 2ε . To re-establish
intertemporal marginal efficiency, the United States must increase its inventory holdings such that
equality is re-established.
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Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic adjustment process of the real price of oil and of US oil
inventories in response to an exogenous increase in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls.
Figure 3(a) plots the marginal convenience yield. Figure 3(b) shows the corresponding inverse US
demand function for oil. In the model, date t inventory holdings are determined by the quantity of
inventories the US decided to hold at time t  1. Suppose that we are at point A in Figure 3(a) at
the beginning of the period. When there is a mean-preserving increase in the endowment spread,
the marginal convenience yield schedule shifts upwards instantaneously, because the United States
values each unit of inventory more than it did prior to the increase in uncertainty. We move along
the inventory schedule from point A to point B. Consequently, by the concavity of its production
function, the United States finds it optimal to increase its future inventory holdings relative to last
period’s inventory holdings. Thus It1 6D IŁt and It D IŁt  It1 > 0. This implies a decrease in
the marginal convenience yield, as the United States moves along the marginal convenience yield
schedule from point B towards point C.
Figure 3(b) shows the corresponding effect on the real price of oil. As the United States
accumulates inventories in response to the mean preserving spread, the real price of oil jumps.
This is reflected in the move from point A to point B. The accumulation of additional inventories
over time at a slowing rate is associated with a decline in the real price of oil from its initial peak,
as the marginal convenience yield falls, corresponding to a movement from B to C in Figure 3(b).
The real price of oil in the new long-run equilibrium at point C will be higher than its level at
t  1, but lower than its impact level. To summarize, we expect the real price of oil to overshoot
in response to increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, whereas inventories will
be accumulated only gradually over time. The overshooting result for the real price of oil is
analogous to the overshooting of the exchange rate in the Dornbusch (1976) model. It is driven
by the assumption that inventories are predetermined and will not adjust fully to an increase in
uncertainty on impact.
Result 2: An Increase in Uncertainty Decreases the Oil Futures Spread
By rearranging equation (13), we obtain an expression for the spread:
Ft  St
St
















































dεt is zero to first order by the no arbitrage condition in the bond market, the first
two terms in this expression are approximately zero. Hence the sign of the expression depends on
the relative magnitudes of (1) the decrease in the marginal convenience yield associated with the
increase in inventories triggered by the shock to the endowment distribution; and (2) the increase
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Figure 3. (a) The effect of an increase in uncertainty on the marginal convenience yield. (b) The effect of
an increase in uncertainty on the demand for oil
in the marginal convenience yield associated with the increase in 2ε triggered by the same shock.

















dεt in terms of the model’s parameters and show that
expression (15) is equivalent to
g12 >
1  B
2εt1   , 15
0
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A  g11, 0 <  < 1; and
A D F00 Qωt  It  ˇEt[F00 QωtC1  ItC1] > 0
B D ˇ[F00ωt C εt  ItC1  F00ωt C Oεt  ItC1] > 0.
Hence, for a given stock of inventories and increase in εt, the spread will decline, provided g12
is large enough. The term g12 measures the shift in the marginal convenience yield induced by
the mean-preserving spread. It represents the sensitivity of the marginal value of inventories in
response to an increase in uncertainty. The shift of g1 reflects the fact that following an increase
in uncertainty each unit of inventory has greater value as insurance against supply shortfalls. In
other words, the oil futures spread will decline if agents’ willingness to pay for an extra barrel
of oil to be used as insurance against oil supply shortfalls increases sufficiently in response to
an unanticipated shift in uncertainty. It is well documented that during past uncertainty shocks
in the crude oil market traders were willing to pay exorbitant prices to procure extra stocks of
oil (see, for example, Penrose, 1976; Terzian, 1985). Thus, large values of g12 seem empirically
plausible. Hence uncertainty shocks driven by exogenous events provide an economic explanation
for the large and persistent fluctuations in the spread that undermine the forecasting accuracy of
oil futures prices.11
6. MODEL EVALUATION
6.1. Test 1: Can the Model Explain the Lower Forecast Accuracy of Oil Futures Prices
in MSPE Rankings?
There is no presumption in the theoretical model that Et[StCh] D St. In fact, equation (14) implies
that in equilibrium Fht may be larger than, smaller than or equal to St. Thus the evidence in
Table VII that on average over our sample period Fht is slightly smaller than St is fully consistent
with the theoretical model. Nevertheless, on average the (approximate) model expectation Fht is
fairly close to St. The reason that F
h
t is a inferior predictor to St is not so much that it is different
on average from St, but that it fluctuates relative to St. At any point in time, the discrepancy
between the futures price and the spot price may be large and go in either direction. Taking the
spot price of crude oil to be $65, about its level in late March 2007, for example, the minimum
and maximum value of the 12-month spread implies that the futures price may differ from the best
predictor by as much as $20 in one direction or by as much as $18 in the other (see Table VII).
Thus policymakers relying on oil futures prices are likely to overestimate or underestimate the
expected price of oil substantially at any given point in time, and the fact that these mistakes
largely average out in the long run is of little consolation. Our theoretical model provides an
11 Earlier we documented that the oil futures spread is highly persistent, but mean reverting (see Table VII). We also
documented that the no-change forecast is the best predictor of the nominal spot price of oil. The conclusion that under
plausible conditions the mean-reverting spread is associated with changes in the precautionary demand component of the
spot price may seem to contradict the random walk result. This is not the case. First, the result about the forecast accuracy
refers to the nominal price of oil, whereas the comparative statics result is for the real price of oil. Second, the forecasting
results are for the total spot price of oil, whereas the results of this section are only for one of the components of the real
price of oil. Third, as Diebold and Kilian (2000) demonstrate, for autoregressive processes with degrees of persistence in
the range documented in Table VII an incorrectly specified random walk model will tend to have lower MSPE than the
correct mean-reverting model in small samples.
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Figure 4. st  fht by horizon: 1989.1–2007.2
explanation of this excess variability. In the model, fluctuations in the spread arise naturally from
shifts in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls and will be indicative of fluctuations in the
spot price of oil driven by precautionary demand for crude oil, provided g12 is large enough.12
Hence the theoretical model helps us understand the inferior forecast accuracy of oil futures prices
relative to St. Whether this explanation is empirically plausible is a question that we turn to next.
6.2. Test 2: Does the Proposed Indicator Move as Expected During Known Episodes
of Uncertainty Shifts?
One way of judging the empirical content of the model is to verify that the spread moves in the
expected direction at times of major unforeseen events such as the outbreak of wars in the Middle
East. In Figure 4, we focus on several clearly defined events in recent history that should have
been associated with shifts in the market’s uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls such as
the Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War (which should have caused the spread to fall) and the
Asian financial crisis and 9/11 (which should have caused the spread to increase as world demand
for crude oil fell, making a shortfall less likely). Clearly, expectations shifts of the type embodied
in our theoretical model are not the only possible reason for shifts in the spread, but arguably they
are the most important reason.
12 Strictly speaking, this link holds if and only if a change in demand for oil inventories is confronted with an inelastic
supply of oil. In the model, this inelasticity is represented in the form of an endowment structure. While this assumption
may be unrealistic for the early 1980s, throughout much of the sample that we consider below this is a reasonable
assumption. Kilian (2008b) documents that capacity constraints in world crude oil production have been binding since
the early 1990s.
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Figure 4 plots the negative of the spread for 1989.1–2007.2 by horizon. This normalization
allows us to interpret positive spikes as increases in the precautionary demand component of
the real spot price. The plot confirms the conclusion in Kilian (2008b) that the sharp spike in
oil prices during the Persian Gulf War was driven by expectations shifts reflected first in higher
precautionary demand, as Iraq invaded Kuwait, and then in lower precautionary demand, as the
US troop presence in the region increased (also see Kilian, 2009). Likewise, the spike after mid
2002 in the period leading up to the 2003 Iraq War is as expected, given that the Iraq War was
anticipated by the market starting in the summer of 2002 (see Barsky and Kilian, 2004). The plot
also indicates that the temporary decline in oil prices following the Asian crisis (and its reversal
after 1999) reflected in part fluctuations in precautionary demand. There is a similar but smaller
temporary decline following the adverse demand shock associated with 9/11. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the spike in 1996 was associated with concerns about tight oil supplies and the spike
in 2000 with concerns arising from strong demand for crude oil. In addition, the plot suggests a
persistent decline in precautionary demand in recent years. Such a decline seems implausible on
a priori grounds, given that recent years have been characterized by widespread concerns about
future oil supply shortfalls, a point to which we will return below.
6.3. Test 3: How does the Proposed Indicator Compare to Alternative Measures
of Precautionary Demand Shifts?
The indicator of expectations-driven oil price increases proposed in this paper is not the only
possible measure. Recently, an alternative measure of the component of the spot price of crude
oil that is driven by shocks to precautionary demand has been proposed by Kilian (2009) based
on different data and a different methodology. Unlike the measure developed in this paper, that
estimate was based on a structural VAR decomposition of the real price of crude oil. The structural
representation of the underlying trivariate autoregressive model is




where εt is the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations and zt a vector
variable including the percent change in global crude oil production, a suitably detrended index
of global real economic activity that captures fluctuations in the global demand for all industrial
commodities (including crude oil), and the real price of oil (in that order), measured at monthly
frequency.
Let et denote the reduced form VAR innovations such that et D A10 εt. The structural innovations
are derived from the reduced form innovations by imposing exclusion restrictions on A10 . The
identifying assumptions are that (1) crude oil supply will not respond to oil demand shocks within
the month, given the costs of adjusting oil production and the uncertainty about the state of the
crude oil market; that (2) increases in the real price of oil driven by shocks that are specific to the
oil market will not lower global real economic activity within the month. In this model, innovations
to the real price of oil that cannot be explained by oil supply shocks or demand shocks that are
common to all industrial commodities by construction must be demand shocks that are specific
to the oil market. The latter oil-specific demand shock by construction captures fluctuations in
precautionary demand for oil driven by fears about the availability of future oil supplies. Kilian
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(2009) makes the case that this shock effectively can be interpreted as a precautionary demand
shock, given the absence of plausible alternative interpretations and given the time path of this
shock during specific historical episodes, during which we would expect precautionary demand to
shift.
The structural VAR model postulates a vertical short-run supply curve for crude oil and a
downward-sloping short-run demand curve that is being shifted by innovations to the business
cycle in global industrial commodity markets as well as shifts in the demand for oil that are
specific to the oil market such as shifts in the precautionary demand for crude oil. Given these
assumptions, one can use the structural moving average decomposition of the VAR model to
construct a time series of the component of the real price of oil that can be attributed to shifts in
the precautionary demand for crude oil in response to changes in the uncertainty about future oil
supply shortfalls. While it is not possible to compare this VAR-based measure of the precautionary
demand component of the spot price to the futures-based measure for the full sample period of
1973–2006 considered in Kilian (2009), given the limited availability of oil futures price data, we
may compare these two measures for the period 1989.1–2006.12, which includes several major
oil price spikes. Since the oil futures-based measure is essentially an index and the VAR-based
measure is not, the appropriate metric of comparison is their contemporaneous correlation.
Table IX shows that the two measures in general are highly correlated despite the differences in
their method of construction. For the sample period of 1989.1–2006.12, the correlation ranges from
39% at the 3-month horizon to 62% at the 12 month horizon. The fit improves monotonically with
the horizon, consistent with the view that shifts in precautionary demand are primarily concerned
with expectations beyond the short run. Thus we focus on the 12-month spread. A correlation of
62% between two independently constructed measures of the fluctuations in the spot price of oil
driven by precautionary demand is remarkably high. The correlation is even higher if we exclude
the last 3 years of data, for which the spread seems implausibly high, as discussed above. Table IX
shows that, excluding the last 3 years, the correlation of the two measures rises to 81% at the
12-month horizon. A correlation of near 80% for most of the sample is evidence both of the
predictive power of our theoretical model of the oil futures and spot markets and of the realism
of the identifying assumptions underlying the VAR-based measure.
Not only does the correlation weaken after 2003.12, but the spread data and the VAR-based
measure of the precautionary demand component of the spot price of oil paint a somewhat different
picture (see Figure 5). Whereas the VAR-based measure on average remains at a high level
after 2003.12, consistent with the perception of sustained uncertainty about future oil supply
shortfalls, the futures-based measure systematically declines. This evidence casts further doubt on
Table IX. Contemporaneous correlation of st  fht and the VAR estimate of the precautionary demand






Note: Computed based on Figure 4 and the VAR estimates of the precautionary demand component of the spot price of
crude oil in Kilian (2008c).
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12-Month Spread x (−1.5)
VAR-Based Precautionary Demand Component of Spot Price
Figure 5. st  f12t and VAR-based estimate of precautionary demand component of spot price: 1989.1–2006.
12. Note: The spread has been scaled by 1.5 to improve the readability of the graph. Since the spread is
essentially an index, that transformation does not involve any loss of generality
the credibility of the negative of the spread as an indicator of fluctuations in the precautionary
demand component of the spot price over the last 3 years of the sample. These observations
suggest that a structural change may have occurred around 2003.12 that is beyond the scope of the
theoretical model in Section 5. Indeed, it has been suggested in the financial press that the nature
of the oil futures markets has changed in recent years, as hedge funds and other investors with
no ties to the oil industry attempted to capitalize on rising oil prices. Data from the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (not shown to conserve space) shed light on the share of speculators
among oil futures traders since 1989 and reveal an unprecedented increase in speculative activities
after 2003.12. To the extent that increased speculative trading tends to raise the price of oil futures
more than the spot price (and hence increases the spread), this fact might provide an explanation
for the weakening of the correlations at the end of the sample. Establishing such a link is left for
future research.
6.4. Test 4: Does the VAR Response of the Real Price of Oil Match the Model Predictions?
Another implication of the theoretical model is that the real price of oil will overshoot in response
to a mean-preserving spread. Figure 6 confirms that the response to an oil-specific demand shock
in the Kilian (2009) VAR model displays overshooting, suggesting that the interpretation of this
shock as a precautionary demand shock is justified and indirectly supporting the interpretation of
the futures-based indicator as a measure of expectations shifts. There is no evidence of such a
pattern in response to other oil demand or oil supply shocks.
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Figure 6. Response of the real price of oil to a positive precautionary demand shock: Point estimate with
one- and two-standard error bands. Source: Kilian (2009). The sample period is 1973.2–2006.12. The model
is described in the text
6.5. Implications for Crude Oil Inventories
Whereas we have focused on the empirical relationship between increased concerns about
future oil supply shortfalls and the precautionary demand component of the real spot price of
oil, the model also has implications for the behavior of inventories in response to increased
uncertainty. Testing these implications is not straightforward, given that inventories move for
many reasons other than shifts in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. It would require
the construction of the precautionary demand component of oil inventories. Moreover, inventory
data are trending, and measures of the comovement between the precautionary demand component
of the spot price and inventories tend to be sensitive to the method of detrending. Finally, there
are reasons to be skeptical of the reliability of global oil inventory data, especially in recent
years.
There is, however, anecdotal evidence from oil industry experts documenting that shifts in
precautionary demand coincide with a strong motive for inventory accumulation. This situation
has been aptly described by Terzian (1985) in the context of the 1979 oil price shock:
Spot deals became more and more infrequent. The independent refineries, with no access
to direct supply from producers, began to look desperately for oil on the so-called ‘free
market’. But from the beginning of November, most of the big oil companies invoked force
majeure and reduced their oil deliveries to third parties by 10% to 30%, when they did not
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cut them off altogether. Everybody was anxious to hang on to as much of their own oil as
possible, until the situation had become clearer. The shortage was purely psychological, or
‘precautionary’ as one dealer put it. (Terzian, 1985, p. 260)
Penrose (1976, p. 46) describes a similar hoarding phenomenon in the period leading up to the
1973 oil price shock, as oil companies became concerned with the possibility of being expropriated.
In her words, ‘the major oil companies became increasingly cautious about outside sales as
uncertainty increased’. These accounts are consistent with the implications of our theoretical
model.
6.6. A Comparison with Options-Based Measures of Implied Volatility
The implied volatility from option prices on oil futures contracts is a commonly used indicator of
the market’s expectation of future oil price volatility. A natural question is how such data compare
with the data in Figure 5. We obtained daily data on the implied volatilities of put and call options
from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). The implied volatility data are computed by the
CRB and are available from January 1989. The CRB calculates the implied volatilities as the
arithmetic average of the implied volatilities from the put and call options associated with a
futures contract of a given maturity. We construct monthly time series from these data along
the lines discussed in Section 2.2 (under ‘Data Construction’). Figure 7(a) plots the 1-month
implied volatility series against the negative of the 1-month futures spread.13 Figure 7(b) plots the
same series against the VAR-based measure of precautionary demand component of the real price
of oil.
It is important to understand that the implied volatility of option prices differs from the statistical
measures developed in our work both conceptually and empirically. The negative spread is an
indicator of movements in the level of the real price of oil—not the volatility in the nominal
price of oil—driven by shifts in uncertainty. There are three key differences. First and foremost,
whereas in this paper we are concerned with modeling the first moment of the price of oil,
implied volatility measures focus on the second moment. This distinction matters. For example,
a decline in the component of the real price of oil driven by precautionary demand all else
equal would be associated with an increase in oil price volatility. This is why in 1994, 1999
and 2002, for example, in Figure 7(b) implied volatility rises, as the precautionary demand
component of the price of oil falls. These features are logically consistent, but qualitatively very
different. Second, option-based measures of implied volatility are derived from the nominal price
of oil rather than the real price. Third, even ignoring the inflation component of the price of
oil, measures of implied volatility are designed to capture uncertainty about the overall price
of oil rather than uncertainty about the precautionary demand component of the price of oil.
Since the latter is only one of several components of the price of oil, one would not expect
these series to be closely related, except when precautionary demand is the primary cause of
higher oil prices, as was the case during the Persian Gulf War. Indeed, Figure 7(b) shows
that in mid 1990 and in 2002/2003 both the level measure and the volatility measure increase
sharply.
13 Qualitatively similar results would be obtained using a maturity of 3 months. Since the implied volatility data contain
considerable gaps, it is not possible to construct continuous monthly time series of implied volatility at longer maturities.
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Figure 7. (a) Comparison of the implied volatility measure with the 1-month oil futures spread. The monthly
implied volatility data are based on daily data constructed by the Commodity Research Board. (b) Comparison
of the implied volatility measure with the VAR-based measure of the precautionary demand component of
the real price of oil
Copyright  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 25: 539–573 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/jae
570 R. ALQUIST AND L. KILIAN
These examples illustrate that we would expect the correlation between implied volatility
and the negative spread to be low, and similarly the correlation with VAR-based measures of
the precautionary demand component of the real price of oil. Indeed, the empirical correla-
tions are only 0.13 and 0.21, respectively, reflecting the conceptual differences between these
series.
7. CONCLUSION
We introduced a two-country, multi-period general equilibrium model of both the spot market and
the futures market for crude oil to provide fresh insights about the interpretation of oil futures prices
and related statistics such as the oil futures spread. The key insights can be summarized as follows.
First, using observations up to February of 2007, we showed that the price of crude oil futures
is not the most accurate predictor of the spot price of crude oil in practice. No-change forecasts
tend to be more accurate, although the MSPE gains from using the no-change forecast are not
statistically significant. No-change forecasts are also more accurate than commercial survey-based
forecasts.
Second, we showed that the larger MSPE of oil futures-based forecasts is driven not by the
bias, but by the variability of the futures price about the current spot price. We documented large
and time-varying deviations of oil futures prices from the spot price of oil, as measured by the oil
futures spread. For example, given a spot price of $65, the 12-month futures price may deviate
as much as $20 from the expected spot price or as little as $0, which helps explain why oil
futures prices are not more accurate predictors than simple no-change forecasts. We showed that
this variability is linked to the presence of a marginal convenience yield in the oil futures market.
We proposed a theoretical model of the oil spot market and oil futures market that incorporates
this marginal convenience yield. The model implies that the oil futures spread is directly linked
to shifts in oil market fundamentals. Our model explains the excess variability of oil futures
prices relative to the no-change forecast (and the resulting lower forecast accuracy of oil futures
prices in MSPE rankings) as a consequence of shifts in the uncertainty about future oil supply
shortfalls.
Third, we showed that, under plausible conditions, the oil futures spread will decline, as
the precautionary demand component of the real spot price of crude oil increases. Thus the
negative of the spread may be viewed as an indicator of fluctuations in the real price of
crude oil driven by precautionary demand for oil. The time path of the oil futures spread
since 1989 suggested major shifts in precautionary demand for oil during the Persian Gulf
War and following the Asian crisis, for example. These results provided new evidence of
how shifts in market expectations about future oil supply shortfalls affect the spot price of
crude oil. Such expectation shifts have been difficult to quantify, yet play an important role
in explaining oil price fluctuations (see, for example, Kilian, 2008b). In addition, we doc-
umented that our measure of oil price movements driven by uncertainty shifts matches up
well with independently obtained VAR-based measures, and that our model predicts the over-
shooting of the real price of oil found in VAR analysis. Our analysis also is consistent with
anecdotal evidence of hoarding in oil inventory markets during times of crisis. Finally, we
contrasted our analysis with the use of option-based measures of the implied volatility of oil
prices.
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